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15 JULY 1970

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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15 July 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 28)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 6 - 12 JULY 1970

Moscow (4102 items)

Treaty With Romania,	(1%)	13%
Kosygin Visit		
Indochina	(5%)	7%
[Vietnam	(1%)	3%]
China	(6%)	5%
Soyuz 9	(5%)	5%
CPSU Central	(8%)	4%
Committee		
Plenum		
Central African	(3%)	4%
Republic		
President		
in USSR		
Mongolian	(--)	4%
Revolution		
Anniversary		
Middle East	(8%)	4%

Peking (2891 items)

Indochina	(34%)	33%
[Cambodia	(29%)	26%]
Domestic Issues	(22%)	23%
Albanian Army	(--)	9%
Anniversary		
Tanzanian, Zambian	(--)	5%
Government		
Delegations		
in CPR		
Sino-DPRK Treaty	(--)	5%
Anniversary		
Sino-Japanese War	(--)	3%
Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

There has been no direct acknowledgment in communist media of recent press speculation that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin's visit to Hanoi was connected with the political settlement issue and that the DRV might be modifying its position. But Hanoi on 15 July issued an "authorized" VNA statement scoring Western press agencies for spreading rumors about Hanoi's "latest viewpoint regarding a settlement of the Indochina problem." DRV media have not acknowledged Firyubin's visit and TASS did not mention it until the 13th--the day after Bombay's PTI reported his arrival in New Delhi from Hanoi. Unlike Indian media, TASS gives no indication that Firyubin's talks with Indian officials touched on Indochina.

Moscow formalizes its public stance on Indochina in a Supreme Soviet statement issued on 15 July. Regarding Cambodian developments, the statement parallels language used by Kosygin in his 7 July Bucharest speech when it says that "having provoked the coup in Phnom Penh," the United States "spread the flames of the criminal war to neutral Cambodia" The statement refers explicitly to a political settlement only in connection with Laos, saying that "the U.S. military," flouting international agreements, are "preventing various political groups in Laos from achieving an agreement on the program of the political settlement" set out by the NLHX on 6 March. (No communist source is known to have mentioned a resolution by the ICC members, reported on 9 July, encouraging efforts for a negotiated settlement among the parties in Laos.)

Continued communist criticism of President Nixon's 30 June report on the U.S. operation in Cambodia and his 1 July TV interview includes remarks by the delegates at the Paris talks on the 9th. Hanoi media have not publicized DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's weekend interview with the London MORNING STAR in which, among other things, he reportedly said that the President's "last speech clearly showed that the invasion of Cambodia has been a complete fiasco." As published in the MORNING STAR on the 13th, Dong also said that the President is trying to use the Paris talks as "a cover for continuing his Vietnamization plan" and that therefore the appointment of Ambassador Bruce to head the U.S. delegation "is not of very great significance."

VNA SCORES "DISTORTIONS" OF DRV STAND ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Hanoi radio and VNA on 15 July carry a brief "authorized" VNA statement taking exception to "rumors" about "Hanoi's latest viewpoint" on an Indochina settlement allegedly spread by

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Western news agencies with a view to distorting the DRV's stand. There is no further identification of the press stories, but they would appear to be those speculating on Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firiyubin's talks in Hanoi. Unlike TASS, Hanoi media have not acknowledged the visit.

The cryptic statement says VNA is "authorized" to say that the DRV position is that expounded in the 1 May DRV Government statement endorsing the Indochina summit conference, in the 2 May DRV Government statement on the U.S. "invasion" of Cambodia, and in the 7 June joint statement on the conclusion of Sihanouk's visit. There is no reference to the substance of any of these statements.

BACKGROUND In the past, Hanoi has from time to time used the device of an "authorized" VNA statement in connection with its stand on a political settlement. Most recently, a 9 October 1969 statement scored "false reports" about U.S.-DRV private contacts. As early as 6 January 1967 VNA took issue with Western press commentaries on Harrison Salisbury's article on his interview with Pham Van Dong. VNA did not acknowledge Salisbury's statement that Dong stressed that the DRV's four points were not to be considered "conditions" for peace talks; it said only that the Premier "actually" told Salisbury "the DRV's four-point stand constitutes the basis of a settlement of the Vietnam problem."

MOSCOW NOTES FIRYUBIN IN DRV, SILENT ON SETTLEMENT ISSUE

Moscow's first acknowledgment that Deputy Foreign Minister Firiyubin had been in the DRV came in a brief TASS report from New Delhi on the 13th, saying he had been received there by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on his stopover en route back to Moscow from Hanoi. A few hours later TASS reported that he had also met in Delhi with Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh. There is no indication of the substance of the talks. Bombay's PTI has first reported Firiyubin's presence in New Delhi on the 12th, and on the 13th PTI said Firiyubin had briefed the Indians "on the latest views of the DRV," adding that New Delhi had indications in "recent weeks" of a "favorable shift" in Hanoi's attitude toward a political settlement.

Moscow--like other communist media--maintains similar silence on the resolution by the members of the ICC on Laos--India,

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Canada, and Poland--which according to press reports on 9 July encouraged efforts for a negotiated settlement among the parties in Laos.* The PTI report on the 13th, noted above, observed that the resolution may have been a Soviet suggestion and speculated that the USSR favors dealing with the Indochinese states separately in order to avoid a consolidation under Chinese tutelage.

No communist source is known to have mentioned an apparent new Souphanouvong initiative on negotiations. But on 13 July Vientiane media and Paris AFP reported that the NLHX delegate in Vientiane, Soth Pethrasi, called on Souvanna Phouma the day before to inform him that a messenger from Souphanouvong would come "in the immediate future" to discuss the possibility of negotiations among the Laotian parties.

SUPREME SOVIET STATEMENT FORMALIZES STAND ON INDOCHINA

The Supreme Soviet statement on Indochina,** carried by TASS on 15 July, in standard fashion expresses concern that the spread of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina has caused the situation there to enter a "new dangerous stage." It also charges that the United States, "having provoked a state coup in Phnom Penh," then "spread the flames of the criminal war to neutral Cambodia"--language similar to that used by Kosygin in his 7 July Bucharest speech. The statement uses fairly strong language in denouncing U.S. "bloody aggression" and "brigandage" in Indochina, but the President is not mentioned. For example, in referring to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cambodia, it says "imperialist propaganda" cannot hide the fact that the "U.S. military" plan to continue aggression there through the United States' allies and by use of U.S. planes and other military materiel.

* On 14 July Warsaw's PAP reported that the head of the Polish delegation to the ICC on Vietnam had conferred with Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and others in Hanoi. A VNA report on the same day says that the meeting took place on 9 July.

** Supreme Soviet statements on Vietnam were issued at the sessions in December 1965 and August 1966, but no such statements have appeared since then.

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The statement assails the spread of U.S. military actions in Cambodia as a continuation of aggression in Vietnam and Laos, and it attacks the Guam doctrine which it says is manifested in Vietnamization and in attempts to create a "Saigon-Bangkok-Phnom Penh military bloc."

Praising the unity of the Indochinese peoples in opposing "imperialist aggression," the statement recalls that the Indochinese peoples' conference in April had proclaimed that the patriotic forces of the Indochinese peoples would "coordinate their efforts in the joint struggle against the common enemy." It states that "loyally performing its international duty," the Soviet Union "renders all round support to the national liberation movement."

POLITICAL The statement records the Supreme Soviet's
SETTLEMENT approval of the "political line and practical
 activity" of the Soviet Government in giving
support to the peoples of Indochina and demanding an end to
U.S. aggression. But it does not directly mention a political
settlement except in the case of Laos; it scores the "U.S.
military" for flouting international agreements on the
neutrality of Laos and "preventing various political groups
of that country from achieving an agreement on the program of
political settlement" set out by the NLHX on 6 March.

Kosygin's message last March rejecting President Nixon's support of Souvanna Phouma's proposal for consultations between signatories of the Geneva conference on Laos, as summarized by Radio Moscow on 15 March, had called for restoration of peace by "consultation between the political forces of the country." Kosygin also welcomed "contacts" being arranged between Souvanna Phouma and Souphannouvong, expressing the belief that "this is the way, if American intervention is stopped," that would "create conditions for a political settlement in that country."

The Supreme Soviet statement says nothing about the Vietnamese communist proposals on a settlement, nor does it mention the Paris talks. It merely calls upon parliamentarians and people of the world to call for "the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal" of U.S. and allied troops from Indochina to allow the people to decide their own destiny, and it says that the United States must strictly observe the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962.

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ROUTINE MOSCOW COMMENT DECRIES U.S. "AGGRESSION," PRC STANCE

Moscow's continued comment alleging that U.S. "talk of peace" is a smokescreen for aggression includes an English-language broadcast on the 13th by Col. A. Leontyev, who cites the New York TIMES for the remark that Ambassador Bruce's appointment as U.S. delegation head is not the "essence of the matter" and that to make the Paris talks work the United States must pledge to withdraw troops and agree to a coalition government.

Mayevskiy, in PRAVDA on 11 July, says nobody "seriously" accepted President Nixon's arguments in his 30 June report and 1 July TV interview that the Cambodian invasion was a "success." Mayevskiy points to a New York TIMES report that the Cambodian "patriots" now control more extensive territory and that the Lon Nol government is in a "more hopeless position" than ever before. He asserts that the "brutality" of the American operation strengthened the unity of the Indochinese people and deepened the political and moral crisis in the United States; he also notes that the SEATO allies were reluctant to respond to Secretary Rogers' efforts to draw them into the fighting in Cambodia. Nevertheless, says Mayevskiy, the Americans want to "seize" Cambodia and continue bombing and artillery support and military aid to Phnom Penh.

On 15 July TASS denounces the U.S. decision to send an ambassador to Phnom Penh, citing "diplomatic observers" for the opinion that the move presages increased U.S. interference in Cambodian internal affairs.

PRC "SPLITTISM" A Moscow Mandarin-language commentary on the 12th, in the course of an attack on Peking's "splittism" in various parts of the world, observes that the PRC line is most detrimental in Indochina. It states that "the firm solidarity among the revolutionary and progressive forces forced the colonialists to conclude the Geneva accord, which brought peace to the people of all countries in Indochina," but it does not in this case explicitly recall that China participated. China's role in the 1954 Geneva conference is directly recalled from time to time as an example of effective united action. This line was taken, for example, in a 6 May Mandarin-language broadcast on Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress.

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The current commentary repeats the charge that Peking's refusal of a Soviet proposal on united action encouraged the United States to launch the bombing of the DRV and later to expand the war in Indochina, the operation in Cambodia being a case in point.

PARIS TALKS: PRESIDENT'S REPORT, TV INTERVIEW SCORED

The communist delegates at the 7⁴th session of the Paris talks on 9 July scored the President's 30 June report on the Cambodian operation and his 1 July TV interview along the lines of earlier Hanoi and Front propaganda. Consistent with recent practice, however, the VNA and LPA accounts of the session gloss over much of the detailed criticism, settling for broad, generalized rhetoric.

VNA says that PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi "flayed all the hypocritical statements" made by President Nixon on 30 June and 1 July, but neither VNA nor LPA notes that he referred to the 3 July PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the President. VNA, however, reports that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy cited the DRV Foreign Ministry statement in pointing out that while "compelled" to withdraw ground troops from Cambodia, the United States is continuing "aggression" by using ARVN and Thai troops, carrying out air strikes, increasing military aid, and "keeping U.S. ground troops handy for a possible return."*

While VNA reflects Vy's remarks on Cambodia, it ignores his comments on U.S. actions in South Vietnam, the DRV, and Laos. For example, it does not mention his statement that the President in his TV interview "blatantly" declared that the United States would continue reconnaissance over the DRV and that the Saigon conference of allied Foreign Ministers was held to discuss the intensification of the war in South Vietnam and expansion of the war to all of Indochina.

The VNA report of the session also gives only a sketchy account of the communist delegates' remarks on a proper basis for settlement. Thus, VNA notes that Thi pointed out the

* The DRV Foreign Ministry said that "Washington has also left the door open" for the return of U.S. troops to Cambodia. See the TRENDS of 8 July, page 2.

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"correctness" of the NFLSV 10-point solution advocated by the PRG delegation. But it ignores his complaint that the President repeated the "same arrogant and unreasonable conditions under which the Vietnamese people would pay a ransom for the end of the war and accept U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam." It further ignores his rejection of the President's comment that a rapid U.S. withdrawal would "sow disasters" among the South Vietnamese people. VNA also omits Thi's spelling out of points four and five of the NFLSV's 10-point solution--on the creation of a provisional coalition government and elections--in response to the President's statement that the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is not negotiable.

The VNA account notes that Vy attacked the United States for "sticking to its aggressive stand, repeating at the Paris conference its absurd demand for mutual withdrawal while using the Thieu-Ky-Khiem junta to oppose the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people." But it ignores his routine recitation of avowals that the DRV has shown "its goodwill and constant serious attitude" and that the NFLSV 10-point program is the basis for a political settlement.

VNA's usual cryptic description of the allied delegates' speeches says that GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam "shamelessly praised the U.S.-staged conference of 11 Asian countries on Indochina" and that U.S. delegate Habib "lamely repeated the old arguments" put up at previous sessions, indicating that the Nixon Administration is always trying to prolong the war in South Vietnam.

PRG FOREIGN MINISTER BINH REPORTS ON PARIS TALKS

On 14 July, Liberation Radio reports that "on her return from Paris" Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, PRG Foreign Minister and head of the PRG delegation to Paris,* reported to the government,

* After leaving Paris, Mme. Binh visited Prague from 8 to 11 June and on the 11th TASS reported her arrival in Moscow, where she was met by Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin. On 17 June Peking reported that Chou En-lai received her that day for a "warm and friendly talk." The broadcast said she had arrived in Peking on 13 June "on her way home from Paris." See the TRENDS of 17 June 1970, pages 5-6.

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its advisory council, and the NFLSV Central Committee "on the situation of the Paris conference" and the activities of the PRG delegation there. She also reported on "new developments in the world movement of peoples, including Americans, who have more and more severely condemned the U.S. Administration" for prolonging and expanding the war.

The broadcast notes that the government, advisory council, and NFLSV Central Committee "unanimously approved" the PRG delegation's activities and "praised it for having perseveringly struggled to unmask the warlike and stubborn face of the Nixon Administration and constantly casting more light on South Vietnam's just stand and goodwill" as reflected in the NFLSV's 10-point resolution. It also says the three bodies noted that the Nixon Administration continues its "aggression" against Cambodia by using Saigon and Thai troops "under U.S. command and support" and continues to "carry out its plot of using Asians to fight Asians." Predicting total defeat for the United States, it routinely states that the one way out of the situation is a "quick withdrawal" of all U.S. troops from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and respect for the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.

CRITICISM OF CON SON PRISON EXPLOITED IN PARIS, OTHER COMMENT

The VNA account of the Paris session says GVN delegate Lam "spoke ill of the DRV and PRG governments in an effort to cope with mounting world condemnation of the savage treatment by the U.S.-puppets of prisoners kept in 'tiger cages'" on Con Son Island. VNA reports that PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi, taking the floor a second time,* "introduced facts found by two American congressmen and an American writer on the 'tiger cages' during a recent on-the-spot investigation." Thi, it says, "sternly condemned the fascist prison regime in South Vietnam and demanded that the U.S.-puppets immediately release all the patriots detained in Con Son and other prisons." VNA notes that DRV delegate Vy "expressed full support" for the PRG statements.

* The account of the communist spokesmen's press briefings after the session, as carried in VNA's information channel from Paris to Hanoi, indicates that a substantial portion of the session involved give-and-take on the question of prisons in South Vietnam. As usual, DRV propaganda media do not report the press briefings.

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In addition to VNA's brief coverage of remarks in Paris, there is a flurry of Vietnamese communist propaganda on conditions at the prison. On the 11th, VNA cited Western sources in reporting the release of information by Representatives Hawkins and Anderson and congressional aide Harkins. On the same day VNA summarized a NHAN DAN commentary which asserts that the disclosures have "only told part of the truth." NHAN DAN recalls a South Vietnam War Crimes communique of 16 September 1969* which "denounced alleged U.S.-puppet war crimes" for the past 15 years and cites some of the incidents. It echoes a Hanoi radio broadcast of the 10th in charging the United States with trying to shift the blame to the GVN although U.S. advisers and dollars "are helping the Saigon puppets" at the prison. It adds "that like the Son My massacre of over 500 people in March 1968, the Con Son penitentiary regime is not an isolated case."

Linkage with U.S. prisoners-of-war appears in a Liberation Radio commentary on 10 July and an LPA commentary on the 14th. The radio commentary, also summarized by LPA on the 12th, says that the U.S.-GVN "crimes at Con Son have unmasked the deceitful arguments and tricks of the U.S.-puppets who have constantly boasted of their humanitarian policy toward war prisoners, who have raised the war prisoner problem again and again" at Paris, and "who have raised a ballyhoo about the release of fishermen whom they had illegally captured in the DRV territorial waters and whom they have called war prisoners."**

* The communique was carried by LPA on 18 September and stressed alleged crimes against political detainees.

** A VNA "authorized" statement on 23 June had reacted belatedly to GVN delegate Lam's announcement, at the 11 June Paris session, of his government's intention to release a group of North Vietnamese wounded prisoners and captured fishermen on 11 July. See the TRENDS of 24 June 1970, page 5. Available comment to date is not known to have mentioned the actual release on 11 July.

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The LPA commentary of the 14th graphically describes alleged tortures used at the prison by both GVN officials and U.S. advisers and contrasts this with NFLSV and PRG "humanitarianism" toward allied soldiers--"showing leniency to them, healing their wounds, and when possible releasing them."

A 12 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, summarized by VNA that day, rejects the notion that prisoners in the 'tiger cages' are "communists" and "undisciplined prisoners." It says that the U.S. congressmen and journalists "declared they had seen with their own eyes many students detained" in the cages and that a number of students recently released from the prison held a press conference in Saigon denouncing the inhumane treatment of prisoners.

On the 14th, according to a VNA report that day, the special representation of the PRG in Hanoi held a press conference "to denounce the monstrous crimes" of the United States and GVN against prisoners at Con Son. The report says the conference was attended by Mme. Tran Khahn Phuong, a member of the PRG special representation and herself once a prisoner at Con Son, as well as by four other former prisoners. It notes that "many" foreign journalists attended the conference, at which the five former prisoners denounced the "horrors" of the prison in graphic terms. At the close of the press conference Mme. Phuong called on the journalists to mobilize world opinion "to check the bloody hands" of the United States and the GVN "not only against the prisoners" but also against the entire population by urging an immediate end of the war.

PRG REPRESENTATIVE IN HANOI RELEASES U.S. SERVICEMAN SWEENEY

The announcement that permission had been granted for U.S. serviceman John M. Sweeney to leave the Vietnam area for Sweden was first released by Liberation Radio on 10 July. The broadcast said that Truong Cong Dong, acting head of the special representation of the PRG in Hanoi, made the announcement at a press conference. Fuller accounts of the press conference were carried by VNA later that day and by Hanoi radio on the 11th. Dong described the action as in line with the humanitarian NFLSV-PRG policy which was "clearly" pointed out in the 23 December PRG appeal to allied military men.*

* The appeal, dated 23 December, was broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 24th. It stated that the PRG "welcomes, supports, and stands ready to create every condition for" U.S. servicemen who, "as collective units or as individuals, take antiwar action to get out of South Vietnam rapidly and safely."

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VNA and Hanoi radio have reported Sweeney's statement at the press conference in some detail, as well as his replies to newsmen's questions. On the 13th, Hanoi radio broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam an "address" by Sweeney to the Vietnamese people before his departure for Sweden, which among other things included thanks for "kind treatment" and a promise to "continue to struggle . . . for peace and justice." A purported letter from Sweeney appealing to American servicemen in South Vietnam to follow his example was broadcast by Hanoi radio in English to South Vietnam on 6 July.

An earlier example of a statement attributed to Sweeney, broadcast on 22 December 1969 by Liberation Radio, claimed that he had crossed over to the Vietnamese people's side two weeks after coming to Vietnam in February 1969 and called on GI's to protest the war.

"VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIA CLAIMED, THAI ROLE ASSAILED

RECENT Hanoi and the Front continue to report scattered
ACTION military action in Cambodia, particularly in the eastern province of Kompong Cham and the northwestern provinces of Siem Reap and Preah Vihear. Liberation Radio on the 8th--and VNA on the following day--carries reports based on FUNK information bureau data, reviewing the May-June period. Citing the usual glowing statistics, the reports claim that during this period the Cambodian liberation armed forces and people wiped out 25,000 U.S. and ARVN troops, including 12,000 Americans. The Cambodian forces are also said to have destroyed 2,000 military vehicles including 1,300 tanks and armored cars, shot down 350 aircraft, sunk 15 war vessels, seized a large quantity of military equipment, and captured "many enemy troops."

Liberation Radio, but not VNA, adds some comment to the statistical data, stating that the Cambodian National Liberation Armed Forces have "grasped revolutionary opportunities, resolutely holding their offensive initiative and unleashing brave, intelligent, and daring attacks everywhere." It says the Cambodians have "satisfactorily coordinated the military, political, and proselyting offensive while actively endeavoring to develop their forces."

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"DEFENSE MINISTER"
ON THAI "MERCENARIES" VNA on 9 July, citing the FUNK's information bureau, reports on the 29 June statement by Khieu Samphan, FUNK official and Sihanouk government defense minister, denouncing the dispatch of Thai mercenaries* to Cambodia.* The statement pledges that the Cambodian army and people will deal the Thai "aggressors" the same "staggering blows" as they dealt the United States and Saigon. A slightly longer version carried by NCNA on the 10th, however, also acknowledges that the intrusion of Thai troops "will cause us some fresh difficulties." In calling on the Cambodian people to enhance their unity and mutual assistance to drive out the Thais, the FUNK official calls on the Thai people and Khmer residents in Thailand to wage a many-sided struggle to prevent the sending of Thai troops to Cambodia.

The issue of Thai military assistance to Cambodia was noted previously in an 8 July Hanoi radio report which cited an AFP dispatch of the 6th in reporting that more than 10,000 Thais of Khmer nationality had volunteered for Cambodian duty. This "proves," Hanoi commented, that the Thai "lackeys" were "brazenly selling the blood and bones of Thai youths for U.S. dollars."

On the 3d, Hanoi radio had cited a REUTERS dispatch from Bangkok which reported that Thai aircraft had conducted air strikes in Cambodia for the first time on 1 July. Hanoi viewed this development as a "new criminal act" by the Thais against the Cambodian resistance struggle.

SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT
DENIAL OF DRV AT ANGKOR On 10 July NCNA carried a "press communique" dated the 9th by the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union denying a communique of the Saigon government which charged that North Vietnam occupies the Angkor ruins. The Royal Government states that the forces of the Cambodian National Liberation Army are "in charge of protection of the monuments of Angkor." Hanoi and Pathet Lao media had denied, on 13 and 17 June respectively, that their troops were present at Angkor Wat.

* The last statement issued by the FUNK defense minister was his message, dated 25 May and publicized by VNA on 10 June, to Prince Sihanouk reporting on developments in Cambodia. See the 10 June TRENDS, page 7.

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SIHANOUK STAND ON USSR RECOGNITION, KOREAN VOLUNTEERS

On 13 July NCNA carried a statement by the foreign ministry of the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union, dated the 12th, refuting the "distorted report" by Canadian correspondent Norman Webster of his 9 July interview with Sihanouk. Referring to Webster's question on the "attitude of the USSR" toward Sihanouk and his government, the statement says Sihanouk declared that "friendship among states is only the coincidence of their interests" and that the Soviets may not have recognized the Royal Government because "the interests of the Soviets and those of ours do not coincide." (Webster had cited Sihanouk as saying that Soviet nonrecognition was disappointing and difficult to understand but that he hoped to persuade the Soviets to come around. He said that he had already sent a minister to Moscow to argue his case and that he planned to send his foreign minister to Moscow.* If recognition came, Sihanouk added, he would visit Moscow himself.)

KOREAN VOLUNTEERS Refuting Webster's alleged "distortions" of Sihanouk's comments regarding Kim Il-song's offer of North Korean volunteers, the statement says Sihanouk declared that the "majority" of the members of the FUNK Political Bureau "do not, for the moment, favor an appeal for non-Indochinese volunteers" because they believe that the Cambodian National Liberation Armed Forces and the "united front of the Indochinese peoples" can defeat the American, Saigon, and Lon Nol troops. According to the statement, Sihanouk added that this FUNK position "could be changed in the light of the development of the situation." (In attributing similar remarks to Sihanouk, Webster added that Sihanouk said he was "greatly tempted" to ask for North Korean volunteers.) The statement notes Sihanouk's complaint that President Nixon's attitude on Cambodia is not "fair play" and that the two opponents in Cambodia were not fighting on "equal terms." But it does not indicate, as Webster had done, that Sihanouk said he thus had the "right to ask those who want to help us."

* Sihanouk's foreign minister Sarin Chhak arrived in Baghdad on the 12th, according to Baghdad media, to participate in the celebration of the Iraqi July anniversaries. Peking's NCNA on the 13th reports Chhak's 6-7 July visit to Algeria. He had arrived in Cairo on 24 June, after visits to India and Ceylon, and is reportedly acting as ambassador to the UAR until a new ambassador is named.

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The only other available communist reference to Sihanouk comments on North Korean volunteers came on 7 July in an NCNA report of a speech he made at a banquet given him that evening in Peking by the DPRK ambassador. Sihanouk quoted Kim Il-sung as having said in 1965 that in the face of expanding U.S. aggression in Vietnam, "nobody can oppose the dispatch of volunteers . . . by the socialist countries"; Sihanouk added that "these remarks can be perfectly applied to Cambodia."

NCNA PUBLICIZES "DEFECTION" OF MEMBER OF LON NOL REGIME

On 15 July NCNA publicized a statement by Keut Chhon, former industry minister in Lon Nol's government, who decided to join the FUNK. The statement--datelined Paris, 10 July--was released by the FUNK representative to France, who commented that Chhon's stand shows the "growing influence" of the FUNK and the "increasing isolation of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique." The Chhon statement denounces the "crimes" of the Lon Nol regime and the "criminal aggression" of the United States carried out with the "consent and participation" of Phnom Penh, but it does not explicitly charge the United States with complicity in the coup.

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MIDDLE EAST

SUPREME SOVIET SAYS MIDEAST STATES SHOULD BE MASTERS IN AREA

A Supreme Soviet statement adopted on 15 July reiterates standard Soviet positions in urging a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East based on full implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution and in affirming the right to existence of all states in the region. A new element is introduced in the concluding declaration that the Soviet Union believes "that only the peoples and the governments of the Middle East states should be masters of the situation in the Middle East," seeming to suggest at the least an interest in reducing the public involvement of the big powers. This would seem in keeping with Moscow's relatively moderate propaganda response to recent Western and Israeli statements and speculations on Moscow's aims in the region and the possibility of a big-power confrontation.

The one vague, pro forma warning of possible increased military danger in the area falls midway in the statement, and is preceded by a charge that the imperialist powers, "above all the United States," and the ruling circles of Israel are responsible for the dangerous situation. The warning says that either the military danger in the Middle East "will grow further--and this might happen if the aggressor is not curbed"--or measures must be taken to insure a political settlement on the basis of observance of the November 1967 Security Council resolution "in its entirety." The statement adds that "passiveness in the face of the aggressor" would allow the imperialists to take new aggressive actions against other peoples and independent states; but it goes no further than to call for unspecified "resolute actions" and for "censure and isolation of the aggressor and its patrons."

Twice accusing Israel of obstructing a political settlement, the statement says that Israel is not fighting for its existence or security but to seize other people's lands. A separate paragraph near the end underlines the Soviet Union's belief that every state in the Middle East has the right to independent national existence, independence, and security--a point appearing with some frequency recently in Soviet propaganda. In charging Israel with annexationist intentions, the statement declares that "any plans" which would enable Israel to prolong its occupation or annex Arab territories, "plans that would place the interests of Israel above the interests of other states of the area," are doomed to failure.

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The Supreme Soviet routinely gives "complete approval" of the Soviet Government policy of all-round assistance to the Arab states; underlining the Soviet peaceful stance, the statement characterizes the policy as one aimed at achieving a "just, peaceful political settlement" of the conflict. In conclusion, the Supreme Soviet mildly expresses the hope that the statement will receive a favorable response and support of all peaceful forces and "will help the states to take the necessary measures"--again unspecified--in keeping with the tasks of establishing a just and stable peace in the Middle East.

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN TALKS PROLONGED; MOSCOW MEDIA CIRCUMSPECT

As the intensive Soviet-UAR talks continue in Moscow following Nasir's arrival there on 29 June, effusive Soviet propaganda welcoming Nasir and lauding the two countries' relations has dropped to a minimum. TASS has issued brief, uninformative reports of the "exchanges of views" between the various Soviet and Egyptian officials, held in an atmosphere of cordiality and "full mutual understanding." Cairo's MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) has been somewhat more forthcoming, reporting the three full sessions of the talks on 30 June and 1 and 11 July, some eight meetings between the respective foreign ministers, and discussions of political and military subcommittees apparently set up at the second full session. MENA has also announced various planned meetings, later postponed and rescheduled, explaining on the 6th that Gromyko's absence in Bucharest and "Brezhnev's cold" had delayed the final meeting; on the 14th MENA said the date of the final session would be fixed in relation to the Soviet leaders' engagement in Supreme Soviet meetings and that Nasir and other Egyptian officials would attend the Presidium meeting on the 15th.

According to MENA reports, Nasir has had only two meetings with any of the Soviet leaders other than the three full sessions: On the 3d he met with Brezhnev and Kosygin following a reception for Soviet cosmonauts, and on the 9th Nasir and Kosygin had a one-hour meeting--also reported by TASS--at Barvikha sanatorium, where Nasir is undergoing medical examinations.

MENA noted that the Soviet leaders and top officials held a special meeting prior to the third full session of the talks on the 11th, which lasted over three hours. According to Cairo radio the following day, Nasir conferred with his advisors--Ali Sabri, Foreign Minister Riyad, War Minister Fawzi,

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and UAR Ambassador to Moscow Ghalib--after the meeting on the 11th, and the three Soviet leaders met at the Kremlin with senior party and government officials "to discuss the whole picture of the Middle East situation before the next plenary session."

As for the substance of the talks, TASS has said no more than that discussions have centered on bilateral relations and major international problems, especially the Middle East. MENA has reported only the fact of the military meetings, at least some of which have been attended by Ali Sabri, presumably in his new capacity as "presidential assistant for aviation and air defense affairs." MENA has said that the Gromyko-Riyad talks as well as lower-level discussions by political experts have dealt with the U.S. peace initiative and that the foreign ministers have also considered "a number of important questions to be discussed at the next UN General Assembly."

MOSCOW COMMENT ON MIDEAST SUSTAINS FOCUS ON MILITARY ASPECT

Soviet comment on the Middle East problem continues to dwell on the military aspect, noting U.S. and Cairo press reports of supplies of replacement aircraft and other materiel to Israel, pointing to the "transitory" nature of Israeli military superiority, and stressing that increased Arab "defensive power" is reestablishing a "real balance of forces" in the region. While drawing a distinction between U.S. statements favoring a peaceful settlement and U.S. actions supporting the Israeli "aggressors," propagandists continue to leave the door open to consideration of the recent U.S. peace initiative and to stress the need for a political solution.

ZAVYALOV IN Panelist Zavyalov, in the 12 July domestic service
ROUNDTABLE commentators' roundtable, guardedly touched on the Soviet role in the Middle East discussed in recent U.S. and Israeli official statements and press reports. He put the onus on "Israeli extremists" for trying to spread military operations in the Middle East and "if possible drag the Soviet Union and the United States into the conflict." Zavyalov found some "pro-Zionist circles" in the United States "unfortunately" inclined to accept Israeli propaganda, and he cited in this regard questions asked of Defense Secretary Laird at a 9 July press conference, such as what military steps the United States could take to drive the Russians out of Egypt. Without mentioning

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Laird's replies, Zavyalov went on to ask if it was not time "the hotheads calmed down a bit" and took a realistic look at the balance of power in the world, and if it would not be better for Washington and Tel Aviv to concentrate efforts on a search for a peaceful political settlement.

In arguing the UAR's right to self-defense, Zavyalov twice referred to Israeli losses of Phantoms which had invaded "deep" into Egyptian territory. He described Israeli statements about Soviet military aid to the UAR as aimed at preparing American public opinion for increased aircraft supplies to Israel, and he dismissed "fabrications" about Russians fighting alongside Egyptians, quoting the UAR official spokesman as stressing that combat operations are waged exclusively by Egyptian armed forces.

Zavyalov mentioned U.S. and Israeli efforts to put pressure on the Arabs at a time when the U.S. proposals are being studied by the Arab countries "and by the other states to which they were addressed." In this connection, he cited the New York TIMES as suggesting that President Nixon's 1 July statement be taken as a warning to both Cairo and Moscow, and he attributed to AP a report that the U.S. Government is "supposedly afraid" of increased chances of a direct Soviet-Israeli confrontation.

RADIO TALKS Commentator Tsoppi, in a foreign-language talk
BY TSOPPI on the 11th, again cautiously broached the "campaign of threats against the Arabs started in the United States on 1 July," remarking that Defense Secretary Laird added to this "military blackmail" and "thinly veiled threats of U.S. aggression" when he said the U.S. Sixth Fleet was on the alert. The Arabs, Tsoppi said, while continuing all necessary efforts to counter Israeli "aggression," have not rejected a peaceful solution; he cited the UAR official spokesman as saying that while the U.S. initiative contains nothing new, Cairo is trying to read something between the lines that could be discussed.

In a commentary on the 13th, Tsoppi again urged a political solution based on a "concrete program of measures" formulated in the November 1967 Security Council resolution which, he said, guarantees the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independent development of the Arab countries and Israel. Tsoppi insisted that were Israel to return the occupied territories to the Arabs, it would "obtain security forthwith."

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PRC FREES BISHOP WALSH, IGNORES ROGERS' COMMENT ON TALKS

Peking announced on 10 July that Bishop James Edward Walsh had been released from prison and left China that day and reported that another "U.S. imperialist spy," Hugh Francis Redmond, had committed suicide on 13 April. By coupling the two reports in the same announcement, and by taking pains to indicate that Redmond had received normal treatment while in prison, Peking seemed intent on counteracting adverse reactions to Redmond's death. The release of the aged bishop is also in keeping with Peking's practice since last October of setting free various foreign prisoners.

The timing of the dual announcement, several months after Redmond's death, suggests that Peking may be signalling that relations with the United States are more propitious now than during the recent period of U.S. incursions into Cambodia, which served as the ground for Peking's postponement of the session of the Warsaw talks scheduled for 20 May. The release of Bishop Walsh, which removes one of the irritants in Sino-U.S. relations, comes after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cambodia in late June. It also follows, and serves in part to offset, the notably harsh comments on the state of PRC-U.S. relations made by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng at a 27 June Pyongyang meeting marking the 20th anniversary of the U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan--the sort of milestone occasion on which Peking could be expected to present a maximum case against an adversary.*

Previously, Peking had announced the release of two Americans on 7 December 1969 after a 10-month detention. A week later Peking reported that PRC and U.S. representatives had met in Warsaw on 11 December, and in January the formal Warsaw talks were resumed.

COMMENT ON Chinese comment on Secretary Rogers' Asian
ROGERS TOUR tour has attacked his statements on the PRC
but ignored his remarks on the Warsaw talks
and on the prospects for improving U.S. relations with Peking.
Citing the Secretary's appeal during a Japanese television

* Huang's remarks are discussed in the TRENDS of 1 July 1970, page 19.

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interview for Peking to abandon its "belligerent attitude," NCNA on 11 July claimed he was making false countercharges in an attempt to absolve his country from blame for expanding the war in Indochina "and launching aggression in Asia." The Secretary's "vilification" cannot harm the PRC but only reveals "the shameless deceitful features" of the United States, according to NCNA. An 11 July PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, pegged to a session of the "Cooperation Committee" of Japan and the Republic of China, dismissed as "nonsense" the Secretary's remark that the PRC threatens Asian security.

WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA Peking's comment on the U.S. troop withdrawal from Cambodia has sought to disparage Washington's moves as a deceitful attempt to cover up continued hostilities in the area. Though Peking has seized on the President's refusal to categorically rule out the future use of U.S. troops in Cambodia--and an article carried in NCNA's domestic service on 6 July referred to the "temporary disappearance" of American ground troops--the implications of the U.S. troop withdrawal for the future of the Warsaw talks have been left unclear.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

KUZNETSOV REPORTEDLY REPLACED; MOSCOW RAISES BORDER QUESTION

Against a background of continuing polemical restraint by both sides, this year's session of the joint commission for border river navigation opened on 10 July, according to a TASS dispatch that day, and a replacement has reportedly been named for Kuznetsov as chief Soviet negotiator at the main Peking talks. According to a Moscow-dated report by the Yugoslav agency TANYUG on the 14th, Deputy Foreign Minister L. Ilichev, who had been a CPSU secretary in charge of ideology under Khrushchev, has been appointed the new head of the Soviet delegation. Ilichev had been a member of the CPSU delegation at the ill-fated Sino-Soviet talks in 1963.

The border dispute was resurfaced in the Soviet press on 7 July in a PRAVDA article which denounced Peking for making territorial claims on vast areas in Siberia. The attack was made in a review of a new book on the history of Siberia rather than in a major commentary, and it has been broadcast only in Mandarin. But its appearance in PRAVDA suggests that the Peking talks are being troubled by Chinese demands for an acknowledgment that large areas in the Soviet Far East were acquired on the basis of "unequal treaties." By expressing its dissatisfaction in this low key, Moscow manages to avoid reopening major polemics while leaking its version of why the talks have encountered difficulties.

Peking's partial propaganda standdown toward the Soviets, permitting itself indirect attacks while reporting Albanian denunciations of Moscow by name, is again in evidence on the occasion of Albania's army anniversary--an event which last year drew blistering Chinese attacks on the Soviets for provoking the border clashes. Lin Piao's message to the Albanian defense minister, which last year was used for the first Chinese comment on the June 1969 international party conference in Moscow, this time called in passing for struggle against "social imperialism" and, in the context of anti-U.S. remarks, referred vaguely to "those who work hand in glove" with the United States.

The anti-Soviet dimension of Sino-Albanian relations was accorded more scope in speeches exchanged at a reception given by the Albanian military attache in Peking on 10 July,

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which was attended by Kang Sheng and PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yang-cheng. NCNA quoted the attache as calling the United States and "the Soviet revisionists" the principal enemies of mankind and as accusing them of colluding to suppress revolution and to encircle China. Huang avoided attacking the Soviets by name but likened "social imperialism" to U.S. imperialism on the score of aggression and war preparation. He called in routine terms for heightened vigilance and strengthened preparedness against war. In keeping with current Chinese practice, he did not echo the theme of encirclement of China.

HUNGARIAN ARTICLE ASSESSES PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY MOVES

As Romania continues to strengthen its ties with Peking and to underscore its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute,* Moscow's Hungarian ally has undertaken to express the views of the orthodox Soviet bloc regarding Peking's efforts to pursue more flexible policies and to seek influence in East Europe. An article in the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG on 11 July argues that recent signs of a new phase in Chinese foreign policy do not signal a change in Peking's strategic objectives but represent only a change of tactics. The article views this development as responsive to the stabilization of the PRC's internal life and to the opportunities arising from its "emerging nuclear striking force."

The article does not address itself directly to Peking's attempts to make inroads in East Europe, but its discussion of Peking's flexibility in wooing elements which are in disagreement with Soviet policy clearly applies to the PRC's relations with Romania and Yugoslavia. Noting that Peking seeks to take advantage of opportunities afforded by other countries' opposition to Soviet policy, it mentions the PRC's relations with West Germany as an illustration and adds suggestively that the list could be continued. The article claims that its analysis shows that Peking pursues a nationalist and great-power policy in the guise of revolutionary and anti-imperialist ideology. Following a familiar Soviet practice, it seeks to portray Chinese policy as aimed at aggravating international relations and interprets the logic of Chinese policy as desiring a clash between the imperialist and "social imperialist" powers.

* See the Eastern Europe section of this TRENDS.

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In briefly reviewing past Chinese behavior, the article blames Peking for committing armed provocations on the Soviet border. Noting that the border clashes occurred while the Vietnam war was in progress and the United States was trying to improve its position, it claims that the border trouble provided grist to the enemy's mill. The article does not mention the Peking border talks, though it concludes by saying that the present normalization of Chinese foreign relations is better than Peking's hostile line in the previous phase.

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EASTERN EUROPE

MOSCOW, BUCHAREST AIR DIFFERING VIEWS OF NEW TREATY

Against the background of continuing Chinese efforts to gain leverage in Eastern Europe and continuing displays of Romanian resolve to cement cordial relations with the Chinese, Moscow media have used the new Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty to underscore Romania's ties to the Soviet bloc and have emphasized for Chinese radio listeners the commitment of the signatories to assist each other militarily against armed attack "by any state or group of states"--the formula also used in Moscow's renewed treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, replacing the former commitment delimited to the European theater.

In comment ignoring the mutual defense clause, Bucharest has in effect emphasized that the new treaty will not compromise Romania's independent course. Ceausescu seemed to go out of his way in a 9 July speech to reassure the Chinese on this score--an assurance reinforced by the departure of the Romanian defense minister for a "friendly" visit to Peking less than a week after the treaty with the Soviets was signed.

The Hungarians, meanwhile, in a major seven-column article in the party organ NEPSZABADSAG on 11 July, appear to express Soviet concern about Peking's efforts to make inroads into East Europe. The article cautions in effect against the notion that the threat of an adventurist China may have decreased and may warrant a letting down of the guard.*

SOVIET COMMENT A PRAVDA editorial on 9 July typifies the thrust of the Soviet comment in portraying the network of bilateral treaties between the socialist countries as forming, together with the Warsaw Pact, "a broad and integral system of mutual commitments of the socialist countries to one another and to the socialist community." Like the USSR's treaty with the other countries in the community, PRAVDA adds, the new pact with Romania "expresses steadfast resolve to take all essential measures, jointly

* The article is discussed in the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.

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with the other Warsaw Treaty member states, to prevent aggression on the part of any forces of imperialism, militarism, and revanchism and to insure the inviolability of the borders of the Warsaw Treaty member states."

a Radio Moscow commentary on the treaty on 9 July views it as a "supplement" to the Warsaw Pact which "strengthens the political and military alliance of the socialist states." And an article in RED STAR, also on the 9th, notes approvingly that the new treaty affirms "unshakeable loyalty to the specific pledges in the Warsaw Pact." RED STAR mentions the "very important" clause on the socialist states' "international solidarity" against imperialism and reaction. It does not, however, specify the mutual defense clause.

The proviso on mutual assistance is highlighted in an 8 July Radio Moscow commentary in Mandarin. Paraphrasing Article 8, the commentary points out to Chinese listeners that in the event of "a military invasion from a certain country or group of countries, the two sides will provide one another with all the means of assistance, including military assistance."

ROMANIAN COMMENT Using the occasion of a speech to a Central Committee plenum on 9 July to reassure the Romanian people and Bucharest's foreign friends that his policy remains unaltered, Ceausescu pointed up the portion of the new treaty that commits the signers to noninterference and respect for national independence and sovereignty.

In tacit response to Moscow's view of the "new" type of socialist relations, aired in Soviet propaganda on the new Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship treaty which incorporates the limited sovereignty concept and economic "integration" in CEMA, Ceausescu defined as the "new basis" of socialist relations the idea that "the independence and autonomy of each party" must be "fully insured." The advancement of the communist movement and its ideas, he added, "presupposes a large and free debate" and "the creative development of Marxist-Leninist teachings in concord with the new economic and social conditions."

Ceausescu did not mention Article 8. As if to assure Peking that the terms of the new treaty will not affect Romania's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, he expressed

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"particular appreciation"--a month after the fact--for the reception accorded the party-government delegation led by Presidium member and Vice President Bodnarus in the PRC capital in early June. The visit, Ceausescu said, highlighted "the development of fruitful relations between our parties and countries" and the desire of both countries "to act along this line in the future, too." Following up on Ceausescu's remarks, AGERPRES announced on the 13th that a military delegation led by Defense Minister Ionita had left that day for "friendly" visits to Pyongyang and Peking. The Bodnarus delegation had also visited both capitals.

An 11 July article in SCINTEIA by the paper's foreign policy commentator Caplescu also seems contrived in part as an exercise in assurance to Peking. The article declares pointedly that the new treaty is directed "against the reactionary aggressive circles of imperialism" and corresponds with Romania's unchanged orientation of developing friendship and cooperation with "all" the socialist countries. Ceausescu announced in his speech that the party's 50th anniversary in May 1971 would be the occasion for promoting further unity with the socialist states, as well as good relations "with all countries, regardless of social system."

MOSCOW PUBLICIZES ROMANIAN BOYCOTT OF NEW CEMA BANK

Soviet media for the first time directly acknowledge Romania's nonparticipation in the new CFMA investment bank in the course of a "press announcement," released by TASS on 10 July, on the signing that day in Moscow of the agreement on the founding of the bank by all the CEMA member countries except Romania. After listing the seven subscribing countries, the announcement says the Romanian assistant permanent representative in CEMA "has made a statement to the effect that the Romanian side will study the possibility of its participation in this or that form in the work of the international investment bank and will make its stand known as quickly as possible." TASS notes that "any country wishing to become a member of the bank can apply to its board officially," provided it shares the bank's goals and assumes its obligations.

The signing of the agreement on the bank, adopted at the 12-14 May CEMA Council session in Warsaw, had been deferred for two months apparently in the hope that Romania might come to terms in that time. The communique on the session said the countries

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participating in the bank "agreed that they will have signed the agreement by 10 July 1970," and a 30 June article in PRAVDA by the USSR's permanent CEMA representative, Deputy Premier Lesechko, noted that the documents approved at the meeting were "drafts."

The issue of member countries' right of veto has evidently been a major stumbling bloc. A Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU article on 19 May--but not the communique on the Council session--disclosed that under the agreement on the new bank not all decisions would be made on the basis of unanimity, the "principle of unanimity" having in the past hamstrung CEMA efficiency. TRYBUNA LUDU said some decisions would be made by two-thirds vote. The 10 July TASS announcement now states that "the most important questions" will be decided on the basis of "unanimity," while "other questions" will be decided by a three-quarters vote.

BACKGROUND Prior to the 10 July TASS announcement, Soviet propaganda had consistently glossed over Bucharest's differences with CEMA ever since the Romanians--according to Western reports--first demanded bilateral rather than multilateral agreements at a Moscow meeting of the organization in 1963. In announcing CEMA meetings boycotted by the Romanians over the years, Moscow merely listed the countries in attendance, without further explanation. The closest Moscow came to acknowledging dissent in its press and radio commentaries was to insist, defensively, that CEMA scrupulously observes the member countries' "equal rights" and "sovereignty."

The 14 May 1970 communique on the Warsaw meeting had introduced hardline elements in calling for the first time for economic "integration" of the CEMA countries and in dispensing with references to equality and sovereignty. But it glossed over Romania's nonagreement to the bank, simply listing those countries which subscribed; Premier Maurer was named elsewhere in the communique in the list of those attending the meeting. The 30 June PRAVDA article by Soviet CEMA representative Lesechko stressed that economic integration was being implemented on the basis of "state sovereignty, independence, and complete voluntariness" and thus "does not presuppose the creation of any supranational organs." It softpedalled the bank issue by noting only that a "majority" of the Warsaw meeting's participants had supported its creation.

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Soviet comment on the investment bank subsequent to the 10 July announcement has not further broached the question of Romanian nonparticipation. But a commentary carried by the East Berlin radio on the 13th remarked at the outset that the founding of the new bank "by seven CEMA members--Romania is still undecided--marks a long debated" and important step in the member countries' economic relations.

WARSAW PACT HOLDS JOINT STAFF EXERCISES IN HUNGARY

Romanian nonparticipation in joint Warsaw Pact exercises on Hungarian territory 1-9 July is obscured in Soviet and allied media. The TASS announcement of the "joint staff exercise of the operational headquarters" of land, air, and naval forces, directed by Pact Commander Yakubovskiy, does not indicate the participating countries. A Budapest radio report the same day notes that Bulgarian Chief of Staff Semerdzhiev and Czechoslovak Defense Minister Dzur, as well as Pact Chief of Staff Shtemenko, "were in Hungary on the occasion of the maneuvers." It says the visiting military leaders were received by Premier Fock, and another Budapest radio report that day says a luncheon for them was also attended by visiting Bulgarian CP Politburo Candidate Tsanev.

Judging by a listing in RED STAR on the 8th, Bucharest sent only the deputy chief editor of its military daily, APARAREA PATRIEI, to a 7-13 July meeting in Moscow of "military journalists of the Warsaw Pact member countries," attended by the top editors or military information chiefs of the other Pact states.

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SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTY

CLANDESTINE RADIO CARRIES OUTSPOKEN ATTACK ON DUBCEK OUSTER

In the face of a continued challenge to the Spanish Communist Party leadership by pro-Soviet dissidents who split with the party over its condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and who evidently enjoy Moscow's surreptitious support, the Spanish party has issued an outspoken condemnation of Dubcek's ouster from the Czechoslovak party.

The Spanish CP Executive Committee had reacted last October to the earlier sanctions imposed on Dubcek and Smrkovsky, declaring in a statement carried by the clandestine Radio Espana Independiente that they contravened "the conclusions of the 20th CPSU Congress" and marked a reversion to "methods justly condemned by the international communist movement." The party now reiterates its position in its newspaper MUNDO OBRERO, in an article broadcast on 10 July by Espana Independiente, which declares that Dubcek's sole offense was his refusal to sanction the intervention as "right and necessary."

Recalling that Dubcek had "bowed with discipline" to earlier party actions against him, the article says he is now being punished for "a crime of opinion" and concludes that expelling a member for dissenting from "this or that decision" while accepting "party discipline" contravenes communist party statutes. "If this regulation is applied by even clandestine communist parties," it asks provocatively, "how and why can it be violated by those which are in power?"

While noting that Czechoslovak leaders have said there will be no repetition of the show trials of the fifties, MUNDO OBRERO expresses alarm at what it views as a continuing possibility of such trials, charging that a "very dangerous mechanism of repression" had been unleashed. Defending Dubcek as a symbol of "hope for the socialist future of Czechoslovakia," MUNDO OBRERO sets out to counter in advance a possible rebuke for intervening in the internal affairs of another party: It asserts that if the August 1968 intervention had not occurred, "no one would feel the need to pronounce on what can formally be considered an internal matter of another fraternal party."

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While the article concludes by observing that the Spanish CP's position on the matter "coincides" with views publicly expressed by the Italian and the British parties, it is in fact far more explicit in its own analysis of the causes and possible effects of Dubcek's expulsion.

PRO-SOVIET Although a communique released in Soviet media
DISSIDENTS on 2 May, after a high-level Spanish CP-CPSU
 meeting on 29 April, had contained signs that
 the Spanish party might be ready to compromise some of its
 differences with Moscow,* the Soviets appear still to be
 backing the schismatic efforts of dissidents led by Eduardo
 Garcia and Austin Gomez, who were suspended from party
 leadership posts in July 1969 and expelled from the party in
 December.

Espana Independiente had aired complaints by the Spanish CP leadership last December that the Soviets were collaborating in the distribution inside the USSR of "biased propaganda" originated by the two dissidents which sought to discredit the party leadership. In the spring of this year the party leadership defensively denied that its differences with the CPSU reflected anti-Sovietism. In the theoretical organ NUESTRA BANDERA, in an article broadcast by Radio Espana Independiente on 19 May, a party executive committee member rejected charges by the dissidents that anti-Sovietism was registered in the party's opposition to the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

That the dissidents continue to operate in the Soviet Union with at least tacit CPSU tolerance is indicated in resolutions issued following a 20 June meeting in Moscow of the aktiv of the Spanish CP organization in the USSR. An 11 July Espana Independiente account of the meeting, presided over by Spanish CP Chairman Dolores Ibarruri and attended by a CPSU representative, lists among the resolutions one that censured "all provocative attempts made by a small factionist group which at the entrance of the meeting hall insulted and threatened those present." Other resolutions condemned the dissidents' attempt "to disintegrate our organization by carrying out a slander campaign against the policy of the party and its leadership" and recommended the adoption of sanctions, "going as far as expulsion," against "the group directing the factionizing work within our organization."

* See the TRENDS of 6 May 1970, pages 26-29.

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The resolutions contained no reflection of CPSU-Spanish differences, and a communique on the meeting expressed a desire to "reinforce the fraternal friendship" between the two parties.

AFFINITY WITH ROMANIAN,
YUGOSLAV, ITALIAN CP'S

In the face of its continuing differences with Moscow, which have also included objections to dealings by the USSR and its allies with the Franco regime, the Spanish party has sought to cement its ties with such parties as the Romanian, Yugoslav, and Italian. Party Secretary General Santiago Carrillo was in Bucharest from 30 May to 4 June and had talks with Ceausescu. A 4 June communique on the visit emphasized the view that "a decisive role" in insuring socialist unity in the socialist camp "is played by the observance in relations among parties of the principles of independence, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and the right of each party to independently draw up its political line, its revolutionary tactics, and its strategy." Addressing an audience of Romanian workers on 3 June, Carrillo hailed the friendship between the two parties, noting that the Romanian party like the Spanish was struggling for communist unity "on the basis of observance of the independence of each party and each socialist people."

The Yugoslav party journal KOMUNIST, expressing ideological affinity with the Romanian and Spanish parties, effusively hailed the Carrillo-Ceausescu talks in an 11 June article. It extolled the 4 June communique as exemplifying "modern and fresh approaches to the problems of the creative development of socialist thought in modern society, completely free from various ideological label patterns and condemnations from the position of monopoly of the truth."

Carrillo visited Yugoslavia from 18 to 21 May and had a talk with Tito, and a communique stressed that the discussions between the leaders of the two parties "showed the identity of their views on the main world problems and on trends in the world socialist movement." On 19 May TANYUG summarized a Belgrade TV interview in which Carrillo called for elimination of blocs as a prerequisite to assuring the right of peoples to decide their own fate. In a 28 May article on the Carrillo visit, KOMUNIST observed that one of the bases for the two parties' "closeness" is their shared view that "equality and mutual respect are preconditions for any successful cooperation between parties and peoples, and also for progressive development of socialism in the world."

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Carrillo was in Italy in early May, addressing an Italian CP rally in Turin convened to support liberty for the Spanish people and to protest against aggression in Indochina. Talks between Carrillo and the Italian CP's Longo in Rome in January had produced a communique stating that in keeping with both parties' position on "the events in Czechoslovakia," they reaffirmed that "independence and equality between the socialist states, as well as respect for the autonomy and unity of the communist parties and nonintervention in their internal affairs," must provide the foundation for unity of the communist movement.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

NEW COUNTY CCP COMMITTEES FORMED, MINISTRIES NAMED

Further progress, however slight, toward rebuilding the party and government structure in China is revealed in the propaganda. Canton radio on 14 July reported several new county CCP committees for Kwangtung Province, Changchun radio on 2 July reported another such committee for Kirin, and Shanghai radio on 3 July referred for the first time to a county party committee in the special municipality, broadcasting an article by the Shanghai county CCP committee.

There have been several references in the media to the central ministries in recent days, including an NCNA release on 11 July naming a former vice minister of textiles as the new "minister of light industry," who is heading a PRC delegation to Iraq. Previously there was both a first and a second ministry of light industry, and the new title may reflect some of the ministerial reorganization rumored to have occurred during the past few months--either an amalgamation of the two former ministries or a new alinement including the textile ministry as well.

A Shanghai broadcast on 29 June also pointed up the renewed importance attached to the central ministries, at the same time indicating that some have not returned to a normal organizational control system. The broadcast told of a launching ceremony for two new ships attended by Liu Shih-hsiung, "chairman of the military control committee of the sixth ministry of machine building," who made a special trip to attend the ceremony. While Liu had appeared previously at Peking functions, he had not been identified as head of this ministry, which controls ship-building.

In a similar reference, a 2 July Hunan radio report of a ceremony at a new steel furnace identified one of the speakers as a "responsible person" of the ministry of the metallurgical industry, who greeted the workers on behalf of "PLA representatives" in the ministry. This report also provided the first clear evidence that former Hunan chief Li Yuan, who has not appeared in the province since April, has been transferred to other duties. Hua

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Kuo-Feng, revolutionary committee vice chairman, was identified as "acting chairman" of the provincial revolutionary committee. In his speech he sounded another note of normality by asking for greater economic achievements "in the fourth five-year plan"--without indicating, however, when the plan would go into effect.

CHANGE IN WESTERN BORDER OF INNER MONGOLIA CONFIRMED

The O-chi-na chi (banner), formerly part of the westernmost meng (league) of Inner Mongolia, was referred to as part of Kansu Province by NCNA on 9 July. There was similar public confirmation earlier this year of prior indications that the three northeasternmost meng of Inner Mongolia had been transferred to the control of China's three northeastern provinces. The three central meng, including the area around the capital Huhehot and the industrial center Paotou, appear to be left intact. The western boundary is still uncertain; several towns on the eastern edge of the westernmost meng are still identified as part of Inner Mongolia.

The Inner Mongolian radio continues to be one of the handful of provincial-level radios that does nothing but relay Radio Peking, carrying no local broadcasts in its Mandarin service, consistent with its behavior since early January. The secondary Mongolian language service, checked periodically by FBIS, contains nothing but translations of NCNA and Radio Peking items.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PARTY CONGRESS POSTPONED UNTIL MARCH OF NEXT YEAR

The 24th CPSU Congress will be convened in March 1971, according to the decision of a Central Committee plenum on 13 July. Only 11 days earlier, on 2 July, Brezhnev himself had assured the Central Committee plenum on agriculture that the congress "will be held this year." Previous assurances that the congress would be held in 1970 were contained in statements by a majority of Politburo members--by Brezhnev, Pelshe, Polyanskiy, Shelepin and Shelest in their June election speeches, and by Voronov in a Moscow oblast speech last March.

The most likely reason for the delay is inability to agree on the terms of the new five-year plan, which the congress must approve. Although the 2-3 July Central Committee plenum on agriculture earmarked the long-term allocations to agriculture, the debate over the share for light industry, heavy industry, and defense presumably continues.

The Politburo appears fairly evenly divided in these matters. In their June election speeches Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Shelest, and Suslov appeared to favor heavy industry and defense, while Mazurov, Kosygin, Voronov, and Shelepin gave preference to consumer goods. Polyanskiy, both in his election speech and in his April SOVIETS OF WORKERS DEPUTIES article, urged an upgrading of the priority of the light and food industries.

Advocates of continued priority for heavy industry appeared to step up pressure for their point of view in late June by singling out Brezhnev's assurances of continued priority for producer goods. In his 25 June speech in the Tatar republic, carried in PRAVDA on the 26th, Kirilenko said that "in characterizing the main directions of the new five-year plan, comrade L.I. Brezhnev in his preelection speech said that the plan provides for further serious growth of industry, especially those branches which produce the means of production, insure the power base of the economy, and determine scientific-technical progress." PRAVDA featured this same Brezhnev formulation in its 2 July editorial.

Counterpressures--at a less authoritative level--were voiced at a 30 June RSFSR Supreme Soviet session on increasing consumer goods. The main speaker, RSFSR Local Industry

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Minister V.K. Uspenskiy, paraphrased Voronov's election-speech statement, declaring that an increase in consumer-goods production is "one of the main tasks" of the next five-year plan. Uspenskiy argued that the "further increase in consumer-goods production largely depends on expanding and strengthening the material-technical base of local industry" (SOVIET RUSSIA, 1 July). Supreme Soviet sessions such as this one, however, are traditional forums for discussion of the consumer sector.

CONTROVERSIAL LINK SYSTEM CONTINUES TO DRAW ATTENTION

Agitation for the controversial link system of farming continues in the central press in the form of favorable reports on link activity, complaints about bureaucratic resistance to the innovation, and appeals for high-level support. Although KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA continues to serve as the main vehicle for the agitation, a 9 June PRAVDA editorial praised the work of mechanized links and criticized local farm officials for paying only lip service to the "progressive" innovation. Despite the grassroots appeals for high-level support, Politburo member Voronov remains the only member of the ruling group publicly committed to the controversial innovation.

There was no mention of mechanized links in the published materials on the recently concluded CPSU agricultural plenum, although the roster of speakers at the plenum included Voronov and another proponent of mechanized links, Krasnodar kray party boss G.S. Zolotukhin. It is noteworthy that KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, in its 5 July editorial on the plenum, applauded the introduction of "progressive technology and advanced forms of labor organization and payment"--euphemisms for the controversial innovation. Moreover, the same issue of the paper featured a frontpage article on mechanized links under the rubric of the plenum's call for "improving the utilization of land and machinery, raising the efficiency of social production in collective and state farms, and achieving a considerable growth of labor productivity and a reduction in the costs of agricultural produce"--areas in which mechanized links have excelled. The article was aptly titled "Trust the Strong."

PROGRESS REPORTS Progress reports on the activities of mechanized links have continued to appear in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (24, 29 May, 1, 5 July), SOVIET RUSSIA (23 May, 12 June), RURAL LIFE (13, 23 May), IZVESTIYA (2 June),

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ECONOMIC GAZETTE (No. 26 for 22 June), and ZHURNALIST (No. 6 for 14 May). These reports have been uniformly favorable, concentrating on the gains in productivity, the reductions in costs, and the improvements in peasant morale resulting from the introduction of the link system.

There has also been some criticism of local farm leaders for opposition to the link system. A 9 June PRAVDA editorial which singled out mechanized links in the Ukraine and Moscow oblast for praise also noted the failure of unidentified local farm leaders and specialists in providing support to the "standard bearers of the progressive technology." A 1 July KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article stressing the potentiality of mechanized links for the development of professional skills among rural youth and arresting the drift of youth from the countryside was sharply critical of the mishandling of links by local farm leaders. In particular, it criticized the leaders of a Kazakhstan sovkhos for arbitrarily lowering the wages in a highly productive mechanized link. As a result, the article complained, the link fell apart and "the baby was thrown out with the bathwater."

Appeals for more active support of mechanized links have also been forthcoming. One of the speakers at the Komsomol congress in late May, a tractor operator from Rostov oblast, urged the Komsomol leadership on both the local and national levels "to show more activity" in support of the link movement (V. Sleptsova in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 May). Curiously, this was the only congress speech published in RURAL LIFE, a paper that has shown little enthusiasm for the innovation in the past. A similar appeal was expressed in a 5 July KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article which described the successful introduction of mechanized links on a cattle raising kolkhoz in Rostov oblast. The article called on scholars to provide "scientific recommendations" on the "optimal variants" of such links and their application elsewhere.

PERSISTENT OPPOSITION Despite the predominantly favorable publicity for mechanized links in the central press, opposition persists. In a lengthy article in the literary journal ZVEZDA (No. 5 for 6 April), Leonid Ivanov, a prolific writer on agricultural affairs, expressed strong opposition to the innovation. As in his earlier outburst against mechanized links in LITERARY GAZETTE nearly two years ago, Ivanov argued that links were incapable of insuring full crop rotation, that the much heralded achievements of Pervitskiy's

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mechanized link were attributable to preferential treatment in manpower and machinery, and that the personnel in links were motivated not by "love for the land" but by love of money. In the course of his argument Ivanov took sharp exception to the views expressed by various link advocates: Georgiy Radov, V. Popkov, V. Chachin, V. Kokashinskiy, Sergey Vikulov, V. Agayev, and P. Rebrin. Although Ivanov took note of the favorable decision of the RSFSR Council of Ministers on links last year, he emphasized the provisional nature of the decision and argued vigorously for the traditional brigade system of labor organization and the norm system of wages. He predicted that the controversial innovation would never make serious headway in the mainstream of Soviet agricultural institutions and practices.

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SOYUZ 9

KELDYSH SEES ORBITAL STATION AS GOAL, TOUCHES ON COOPERATION

Moscow has devoted a substantial volume of propaganda over the past six weeks to the record 18-day flight of Soyuz 9, which was launched on 1 June. It portrays the flight as yet another important step toward the construction of orbital stations, but is no more forthcoming on the timetable for such stations than propaganda on earlier space feats. Thus Soviet Academy of Sciences President Keldysh, in response to a question at a 9 July Moscow press conference, fell back on the standard formulation that permanent orbital stations will be created "within the next few years."

At the same press conference, broadcast by the Moscow domestic service, Keldysh said that the main tasks of the Soviet space program "in the next few years" are, in addition to the creation of orbital stations, the exploration of the solar system and of near-earth space with automatic devices and the exploitation of spaceflights "for the national economy--for communications, meteorology, navigation, and so on." Perhaps reflecting a sensitivity on the costs of the space program, other spokesmen as well as routine comment have joined Keldysh in giving prominent play to the notion that the flight has made important contributions to the national economy.

In response to another question at the press conference, Keldysh said that the USSR has never announced and never planned a manned landing on the moon, adding that "we will not be flying to the moon in the near future."

SOVIET-U.S. COOPERATION On the matter of cooperation with the United States, an issue virtually ignored in comment on Soyuz 9, Keldysh noted that "several correspondents" had asked about NASA chief Paine's proposal that the U.S. and Soviet space research programs "include the evolving of standardization in docking mechanisms in order to contribute to rescue work in space." According to Keldysh, "we have not yet received such a proposal. If we do receive it, we will devote maximum attention to it. Of course, the question demands technical study."

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At a later point in the press conference, in answer to a question on U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the creation and use of a permanent orbital station, he stated that "we will devote maximum attention to proposals concerning, so to speak, cooperation, in particular with regard to docking, to the standardization of docking components."

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CEYLON

While Moscow has commented approvingly and optimistically on the prospects for Ceylon's new United Front government led by Mrs. Sirimawo Bandaranaike, elected in an upset victory on 27 May, Peking is behaving cautiously toward the new leftwing government, providing only reportorial publicity for actions by the regime which accord with PRC positions.

Mrs. Bandaranaike's election was greeted approvingly by the governments of North Korea, North Vietnam, the GDR, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam--all of which were promised full diplomatic recognition by the United Front in its pre-election program--as well as by Moscow's East European allies.

MOSCOW COMMENTS APPROVINGLY ON UNITED FRONT GOVERNMENT

With Kosygin's 29 May congratulatory message to Mrs. Bandaranaike setting the tone, Soviet media promptly elaborated on the prospects for Ceylon created by the "convincing victory" of the United Front government in which the pro-Moscow Communist Party of Ceylon (CCP/M) is a participant.* A PRAVDA article and broadcasts to South Asia on the 29th stressed that the election victory registered the confidence of the majority of the voters in the election program of the United Front and their rejection of the United National Party's domestic and foreign policies for favoring Ceylonese and foreign capitalists.

Viewing the election as a mandate for "democratic reforms within the country," the commentaries emphasized the importance of nationalizing foreign banks and companies--particularly Western oil monopolies--and of establishing state control over tea and rubber plantations. Also highlighted were the Front's foreign policy program planks of "active neutrality"; establishment of full diplomatic relations with the DRV, the DPRK, the GDR, and the South Vietnamese PRG; severance of diplomatic relations with Israel until Israeli forces withdraw from occupied Arab territory; support of national liberation movements; and struggle against imperialism.

* While denouncing the electoral system, the pro-Chinese CCP entered one candidate--the party's only member of the last parliament, to which he had been elected as a member of Mrs. Bandaranaike's party. He was soundly defeated in the election.

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At the same time, Moscow has evinced typical caution, conveyed in one commentary's remark that realization of the United Front program "could" contribute to advancing Ceylon "on the road of progress and to raising and consolidating its international prestige" and that "if" Ceylon adheres to its professed policy of neutrality, it will create favorable conditions for domestic developments. A NEW TIMES article (No. 23, 4 June 1970) emphasized the difficulties to be overcome and the "magnitude of the task" facing the United Front in the implementation of its promised reforms and warned that "the big and complex tasks" can be carried out only "if all the country's progressive, democratic forces act in unison." Subsequent comment has pointed to problems inherited from the preceding regime.

Soviet media gave restrained play to the role of the CCP/M in the Front's election victory, with some of the commentaries merely noting that the CCP/M is a participant in the United Front. An English-language broadcast to South Asia on 29 May mentioned that the CCP/M had "contributed" toward the development of important points of the Front's pre-election platform and stressed that the party received "a good many more votes" than in the last election, "which means a larger representation in parliament." It did not go on to explain that this "larger representation" consisted only of an increase of two seats for a total of six in the 157-seat parliament. TASS noted on 31 May that CCP/M General Secretary Pieter Keuneman had been appointed to the cabinet as minister of housing.

Soviet media point to the alleged discomfort of "imperialist circles" with the Front's "progressive" domestic and foreign policies. TASS on 23 June noted Ceylon's announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR "despite certain West German pressure and attempts to blackmail it"; and on the 27th it cited the Ceylon Government's intention to ask the Peace Corps to leave Ceylon.

PEKING ABSTAINS FROM COMMENT ON CEYLONese AFFAIRS

Although Western sources reported that Chou En-lai sent a congratulatory message to Mrs. Bandaranaike on her election, monitored Chinese media did not report it and carried no comment on the election campaign. NCNA on 30 May transmitted

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only a terse four-sentence report on the swearing in of Mrs. Bandaranaike as Prime Minister following her election victory.

Peking has offered no comment on Ceylonese domestic affairs, although it has publicized reports on some of the Front's foreign policy actions. For example, NCNA on 23 June reported Mrs. Bandaranaike's meeting with two officials of Sihanouk's government in exile; on 30 June it quoted at length from her foreign policy speech to parliament, stressing her criticism of the Soviet Union's Czechoslovak venture, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and Israel's occupation of Arab territory; and on 8 July it reported the new government's decision on the Peace Corps. NCNA has noted Ceylon's establishment of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and North Korea, although it had ignored Ceylon's diplomatic recognition of the GDR in mid-June.

Peking's only references to Ceylon-PRC relations have been NCNA reports of "a friendly talk" between Mrs. Bandaranaike and the Chinese charge d'affaires on 10 June, another "cordial and friendly talk" between the two on 29 June, and a "cordial and friendly talk" in Peking on 12 July between Chou En-lai and Ceylon's ambassador to China, who "was going to leave his post."

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KOREAN TREATY ANNIVERSARIES

MOSCOW CONTINUES, PEKING REVERTS TO STANDARD TREATMENT

Observances of the ninth anniversaries of the signing of the treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the DPRK and the USSR (6 July) and the PRC (11 July) are commensurate with the current state of relations between North Korea and its two large allies. Moscow has given the anniversary of the Soviet treaty largely standard propaganda treatment. During the past three years of cool Sino-Korean relations, the PRC had marked the anniversary of its treaty with North Korea with the customary amenities but had given the ceremonies minimal publicity. This year there is considerable Peking play for the event.

TREATY WITH USSR The anniversary was celebrated with the usual banquets held by the respective ambassadors, attended by Soviet Deputy Premier Novikov in Moscow and by DPRK Vice Premier Pak Song-chol in Pyongyang. Pak has been the usual ranking banquet guest each year; while Novikov or another Soviet vice premier customarily attends the banquet in Moscow, last year the ranking guest was the lower-level vice president of the Supreme Soviet. Both sides briefly report that a meeting was held in Moscow under the sponsorship of friendship societies, and both report exchanges of greetings messages by the societies. These have been normal features of the anniversary, although imexplicably last year there was publicity for neither the Moscow meeting nor the messages. Pyongyang does not normally hold a meeting. Moscow has carried the usual press articles this year, and NODONG SINMUN also publishes an article; usually in the past it has commented editorially.

The events are reported as having been held in a "friendly atmosphere," and the treaty is routinely praised as helping to consolidate the friendship of the two peoples as well as maintaining peace in the Far East and safeguarding the "building of socialism and communism" in the two countries. Soviet comment, as is customary, recalls Soviet economic and technical aid given North Korea over the years, the peaceful assistance normally highlighted on this occasion.

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Moscow supports the DPRK and South Korean "patriots'" struggle to oust the U.S. troops from the South and achieve "peaceful" unification, but it typically plays down the theme of U.S. "war preparations" and "provocations" in Korea. Pyongyang is characteristically more outspoken; the NODONG SINMUN article, for example, says that the treaty contributes to frustrating U.S. "aggressive maneuvers."

TREATY WITH PRC The banquets marking the Sino-Korean treaty anniversary held by the respective ambassadors were attended by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in Peking, and by Vice Premier Pak Song-chol and Chief of Staff O Chin-u in Pyongyang. Friendship associations in both capitals also sponsored banquets and exchanged greetings messages. As in the case of the Soviet treaty anniversary, Pyongyang marks the occasion with a NODONG SINMUN article rather than the usual editorial comment.

Vice Premiers Li and Pak attended the embassy banquets last year, and although the 1968 anniversary was marked at a lower level, Vice Premiers Pak and Chen I attended the banquets in 1967. Peking gave the occasion scant attention last year, publicizing only a brief NCNA report of the DPRK envoy's banquet. In 1968 Peking ignored the occasion entirely, and in 1967 it carried only brief NCNA reports of the various events. The fifth anniversary in 1966, prior to the serious deterioration of Sino-Korean relations, got higher-level treatment from both sides.

More effusive language is used than on the occasion of the Soviet treaty observance, with both Pyongyang and Peking describing the atmosphere as "overflowing with feelings of militant solidarity and warm fraternal friendship." The friendship of the two peoples, "sealed in blood," is praised repeatedly, and their "unity" is emphasized. Speakers at the banquet in Peking warned that if the United States ignites aggression, it will be defeated again "in the face of the united strength of the peoples of Korea and China."

The propaganda on both sides states that the Chinese treaty defends the "security and revolutionary gains of the Korean and Chinese people from the armed invasion by the imperialists," as well as safeguarding peace in Asia and the socialist gains

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of the two peoples. Banquet speakers asserted that the treaty reflects the two peoples' determination to "resolutely fight and defend the socialist gains and peace from the aggression of U.S. imperialism." A message from friendship societies carried by NCNA refers to alleged U.S. provocations and war threats against the Chinese and Korean people and warns that if the U.S. and Japanese "reactionaries impose a war upon us, the Chinese people will resolutely discharge the obligations imposed on them by the Sino-Korean treaty" and will "deal telling blows at the aggressors until the enemy is defeated completely."

Peking does not take the opportunity to repeat the polemical anti-Soviet remarks that its spokesmen voiced on the Korean War anniversary although the PRC ambassador, at the banquet in Pyongyang, asserted that the Chinese people, armed with "Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tsetung thought," are determined to carry to the end the struggle against "imperialism, modern revisionism, and the reactionaries in all countries." This remark, reported by NCNA, is omitted in KCNA's report of the banquet speeches.

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